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1. Overview 
Political transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy can have a variety of outcomes. This 
rapid literature review looks at the factors affecting the success or failure of political transitions. 
Because of the diverse nature of the countries that have experienced political transitions it is very 
difficult to come up with a list of ‘best practices’ (Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, p. 16). However, there 
are a number of general factors affecting the success or failure of political transitions. These 
include: 
• The type of regime prior to the political transition: Dominant party regimes are the 
most likely form of autocratic regime to democratise. 
• The characteristics of the new leader of the transitional government: These have a 
significant influence on the success or failure of the transition process. 
• The influence of ICT: ICT can have both a positive and a negative influence on political 
transitions. It can bolster support for democracy but it can also serve to spread anti-
democratic messages. 
Key actors can have a significant impact on the success or failure of transition processes: 
• Military: Both the domestic military and international armed forces can play a part in 
ensuring the success of political transitions. 
• Non-state actors: Labour unions have played an important role in mediating disputes 
between political parties in Tunisia. 
• Political parties: Political parties play a key role in political transitions. 
• Elections: The degree to which the first election held following the fall of the old regime 
is free and fair has a significant impact on the way in which future elections are 
conducted, and therefore on the democratisation process. 
• International actors: International actors can play a significant role in supporting new 
governments in the transition phase. However, this is dependent on the leverage they 
have, and the linkages between them and the country undergoing the transition. 
Moreover, any assistance provided should be at the request of local actors and should be 
sensitive to local conditions. 
There is a considerable body of literature on political transitions. The literature consists of books, 
peer-reviewed journal articles and opinion pieces. The studies considered in this review use both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. In terms of regional focus, much of the literature looks at 
political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa in the context of the Arab Spring. The 
literature identified during the course of the research was largely ‘gender-blind’ and did not 
consider the perspectives of persons with disabilities.  
2. General factors affecting success or failure of political 
transitions 
A report published by International IDEA on successful political transitions, argues that ‘given the 
diverse circumstances and trajectories of transitions from authoritarian rule toward democracy, 
there can be no ‘one size fits all’ model or simple manual of ‘best practices’ for such transitions’ 
(Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, p. 16). It finds that while ‘iconic events can play a vital role in catalysing 
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or symbolising political transformation, the road toward democracy often begins years before 
(and extends years after) these moments’ (Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, p. 10). Moreover, once 
these transitions begin, they proceed at different speeds, with progress often being followed by a 
temporary reversal in progress (Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, p. 11). 
International IDEA finds that in order to ensure the success of political transitions, those who took 
power had to (Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, pp. 20-21): 
▪ create civil order and end violence, while ensuring that all security and intelligence forces 
would be subject to control by the new civilian authorities.  
▪ inspire domestic trust and gain international legitimacy. This often involved developing 
inclusive and fair electoral procedures.  
▪ assure that those who took office would be well prepared, technically and politically, for 
their new governing responsibilities.  
▪ balance the need for bureaucratic, technocratic, security and judicial expertise against 
the aim to limit the influence of the previous regime.  
▪ balance responding victims of human rights violations perpetrated by the previous regime 
and holding perpetrators accountable while preserving the loyalty of security forces 
(some of whose members had been involved in these violations).  
▪ establish or protect the autonomy and authority of independent judiciaries and 
independent media that could hold national executives and others accountable.  
▪ achieve economic growth, increased employment, and control inflation, while improving 
the provision of services and increasing public expenditures to meet the needs of the 
poor. Leaders of all the transitions included in the International IDEA study adopted 
market-oriented approaches and prudent monetary and fiscal policies. 
Regime type 
A quantitative study of the conditions that increase the likelihood of democratisation after regime 
change shows that personalist dictatorships are less likely to democratise than dominant-party 
regimes. Moreover, monarchies are unlikely to be overthrown and are very unlikely to be 
followed by democracy if this does happen. The study finds that the way old regimes were 
overthrown in the MENA countries is also likely to lower the likelihood of democratisation. 
Autocratic regimes that end in violence are less likely to democratise, as are those that are 
forced out rather than ceding power via negotiated transitions (Geddes et al, p. 37). 
Leaders 
According to International IDEA, the prospects for building democracies are highly dependent on 
the performance of the new leader during the transition period. In cases of successful transitions 
leaders had the following qualities (Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, pp. 50-51): 
• Each had a strategic sense of direction toward more inclusionary and accountable 
governance, and a fundamental preference for peaceful and incremental transformation.  
• They captured the mood of citizens and reinforced the efforts of political parties and 
social organisations to progress toward democracy.  
• They diversified and expanded their own support bases and were able to assess the 
interests and influence of multiple power centres and interest groups. Moreover, they 
often found paths toward political compromise and accommodation.  
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• Many showed resolution and courage, sometimes risking their lives in conditions of 
polarisation and violence. 
• They had the self-confidence needed to take difficult, decisive and timely decisions with 
conviction.  
• Most relied heavily on competent associates who shared political values and specific 
expertise in order to deal with contentious issues. Although they could (and did) make 
key choices personally, the majority focused on building consensus, forging coalitions, 
constructing political bridges, and communicating consistently with key constituencies 
and the general public.  
• They were generally able to persuade others to accept their decisions by understanding 
and responding to the core interests of diverse actors, including adversaries.  
• Although they were deeply grounded in their respective national societies and relied 
primarily on domestic relationships, each of these leaders knew how to mobilise external 
support without becoming instruments of foreign actors.  
• They adjusted rapidly to events and were able to seize the initiative.  
ICT 
The International IDEA report also addresses the issue of ICT and its influence on transition 
processes, both positive and negative. It argues that those who want to undertake or support 
democratic transitions need to learn how to use new technologies and combine them with 
‘deliberation, negotiation, coalition building, compromise and consensus building’ (Lowenthal & 
Bitar, 2015, p. 46). 
3. The role and impact of key actors in political transitions 
Military 
One study on the role of the military in political transitions argues that the military can generally 
suppress most challenges to authoritarian rule. However, in some conditions they support 
political liberalisation, such as when faced with popular demonstrations. It goes on to argue that 
the military are likely to support transitions from authoritarianism when there is intense conflict 
within the military; and when as a result of this conflict, marginalised officers either enter into a 
pact with the domestic opposition or have foreign backing to act against the regime. These 
marginalised officers’ decision to turn against authoritarianism is a move to both overthrow the 
regime, and to eliminate their rivals within the armed forces (Lee, 2009). 
According to Blair (2016, p.10), the military in mature democracies can play a part in influencing 
transition processes. Armed forces have many points of contact, including attachés in their 
embassies, visits of delegations, joint exercises and international military events, and education 
and training in each other’s countries. Blair argues that military democratic influences are spread 
by example.  He posits that the most advanced, skilled, and respected armed forces in the world 
are those of the mature democratic countries and that military leaders of other countries often 
seek to emulate them. The paper also argues that officers from autocratic countries who have 
served in peacekeeping missions with officers from democracies are generally more progressive 
within their own armed forces on return to their home country (Blair, 2016, p. 10). 
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Political parties 
According to Fukuyama (2014) democratisation has three stages: (1) initial mobilisation to oust 
the old regime, (2) holding free elections, and (3) being able to deliver public services and public 
goods. He argues that while the first stage often succeeds, the second and third stages are very 
hard to realise because of lack of experience with the organisation of political parties.  
According to Lowenthal & Bitar, in successful transitions, political parties played a key role. They 
established regional and territorial networks, built ties with social movements and civil society 
organisations, helped design and implement strategies to counter the authoritarian regime, and 
mobilised international support. Moreover, parties helped to select candidates for, organise and 
carry out electoral campaigns; prepare platforms and programmes for electoral competition and 
governance; train cadres for public service; mediate conflict among political allies; and ensure 
that governments did not lose touch with their support base (Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, p. 33). 
Non-state actors 
Labour unions can play a role in political transitions, but this role and its success varies from 
country to country. In Tunisia the UGTT (Tunisian General Labour Union) has arguably been a 
‘pivotal player’ in the transition mediating political divisions between Tunisia’s political parties 
(Bishara, 2014, p. 8). In Egypt, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) 
and the Egyptian Democratic Labor Congress (EDLC) were established in 2011. There was a 
huge increase in the number of independent unions: in late 2013, EFITU claimed a membership 
of around 300 unions, as did the ELDC. The EFITU and the EDLC have a democratically elected 
leadership, making them ‘legitimate representatives of their members’ interests’ (Bishara, 2014, 
p. 3). However, the post-Mubarak regime took measures to limit these organisations’ ability to 
operate freely (Bishara, 2014, p. 4). 
Elections 
The context in which elections take place can affect their democratising potential. According to 
Cheeseman, ‘structural conditions such as poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, a history of civil war 
and resource dependency are known predictors of democratisation’ (Forthcoming, p. 218). 
Moreover, a quantitative analysis in an edited volume finds that if the first multiparty elections 
that a country holds are free and fair, this sets the expectations of citizens and political actors for 
future electoral contests (Van Ham & Lindberg, forthcoming, p. 232).  Such elections tend to 
generate trust among the losers of the elections. As a result they have greater reason to believe 
that if the elections continue to be fair, they will have a chance of winning the next elections (Van 
Ham & Lindberg, forthcoming, p. 232). In addition, those who win the elections, such as 
parliamentarians and ministers, do so because of due process. They therefore have an interest 
in maintaining these processes even if the party leader wishes to return to pre-democratic ways. 
On the other hand, flawed first elections make political actors and citizens believe that electoral 
manipulation is an acceptable way of competing in elections. Thus, a flawed first election 
generates losers who may not accept the results, and winners who will be motivated to 
undermine the quality of future elections (Van Ham & Lindberg, forthcoming, p. 232). Moreover, 
in severely flawed elections opposition parties and leaders may be excluded, as political 
exclusion is commonly used as a tool of electoral manipulation in Africa. In such cases, 
incumbents often enjoy inflated majorities, and therefore have more room to undermine 
institutions that could monitor elections, making it possible for them to rig future elections more 
6 
easily (Van Ham & Lindberg, 2017, pp. 232-233). 
The study also finds that an election that is neither completely flawed nor completely free and fair 
does not provide the same level of clarity to political actors and citizens, nor does it create such a 
clear division or concentration of power. If poor election quality was the result of administrative 
problems, political actors and citizens may believe that future elections can still be free and fair. 
Moreover, in elections falling into this category problematic flawed, opposition actors are likely to 
win at least some representation. This means that the quality of subsequent elections will depend 
on the outcome of power struggles between those in power and the opposition after the first 
elections. According to the authors, it is therefore unsurprising that democratic change is most 
likely to occur in regimes that start off by holding ‘ambiguous’ elections (Van Ham & Lindberg, 
2017, p. 233). The study finds that while elections can lead to greater democratisation they can 
also serve to legitimate authoritarian leaders, who institutionalise non-democratic elections, 
thereby stabilising their autocratic regimes (Van Ham & Lindberg, 2017, p. 234). 
International actors 
In successful transitions, international actors have provided assistance in areas that typically put 
transitions at risk, based on their prior experience. These include civil-military relations, 
transitional justice, the conduct of credible elections, police reform and the oversight of domestic 
intelligence agencies, as well as in disarming hostile surveillance and intelligence activity 
(Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, p. 37). They have also promoted peer group communication and 
training opportunities with counterparts in the armed forces, business and labour groups, 
professional associations and other sectors, which sometimes helped reinforce democratic 
attitudes among these groups. In addition, they have provided reassurance and practical advice 
(Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, p. 38). International organisations, governments, foundations and non-
governmental organisations sometimes play an important role in responding to social and 
economic needs during transition periods. International economic assistance can be crucial when 
it is provided in response to local needs and in cooperation with local actors (Lowenthal & Bitar, 
2015, p. 38).  
According to International IDEA, democracy can only take root in a society once it becomes the 
most accepted way to contend for political power. International actors can achieve a lot to 
encourage progress towards democracy, but they cannot replace domestic actors, and should 
provide support at their request. International actors should ‘avoid impatient, ineffective and 
counterproductive interventions and instead contribute more consistently over the longer term.’ 
(Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, p. 38). Instead they should ‘listen, raise questions that arise from 
comparative experience, and encourage local actors to consider issues from various 
perspectives, instead of promoting pre-packaged answers’ (Lowenthal & Bitar, 2015, pp. 38-39). 
Levitsky & Way (2010) discuss international leverage and the concept of linkage and how they 
affect the outcome of political transitions. They define leverage as the extent to which a country 
is vulnerable to external pressure to democratise.  
▪ High leverage – a country lacks bargaining power and is strongly affected by Western 
punitive action (e.g. cuts in external assistance, sanctions, etc.) 
▪ Low leverage – a country has significant bargaining power and is not significantly 
affected by Western punitive action.  
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Linkage refers to the density of ties and cross-border flows with the West. It has six dimensions: 
▪ Economic linkage – flows of trade, investment, credit 
▪ Intergovernmental linkage – bilateral diplomatic and military ties, participation in 
Western-led alliances, treaties and international organisations 
▪ Technocratic linkage – share of the country’s elite that is Western educated or has 
professional ties to Western universities or western-led multilateral institutions 
▪ Social linkage – flows of people across borders, including tourism, immigration and 
refugee flows, and diaspora networks 
▪ Information linkage – flows of information across borders via telecommunications, 
internet connections and western media penetration 
▪ Civil-society linkage – local ties to western-based NGOs, international religious and 
party organisations, and other transnational networks (Levitsky & Way, 2010, pp. 43-44) 
Geographical proximity is however the key source of linkage, as it creates opportunities for 
interaction between states and can also create interdependence between them (Levitsky & Way, 
2010, p. 44). It is important to note that not all linkage is with the West, and that strong ties to 
non-Western countries can affect how countries respond to Western pressure (Levitsky & Way, 
2010, p. 50) 
According to Levitsky & Way, linkage increases the chances of authoritarian collapse leading to 
‘stable’ democratisation (2010, p. 51) Incentives for successor governments to democratise in 
high-linkage contexts include: 
• Officials in successor governments maintain ties to Western actors that were created 
while they were in opposition. These frequently take the form of resources, protection, 
and legitimacy. These leaders are ‘unlikely to “bite the hand that helped get them there.”’ 
• New governments tend to face same level of international scrutiny as their predecessors 
in cases where international monitoring remains in place. Therefore, even former 
opposition leaders who are not inclined to lead democratically, face strong pressure to do 
so. 
Where linkage is low, external pressure is often insufficient to bring about stable democratisation. 
In these cases political transitions are more likely to result in new undemocratic governments 
coming to power, or in new regimes being more vulnerable to ‘authoritarian reversal’ if they have 
democratised (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p.  52) The authors argue that this holds true even in 
situations where there is high leverage. This is because even though international pressure may 
be high it is often ‘limited and sporadic’ focusing on ‘minimally acceptable elections’ (Levitsky & 
Way, 2010, p. 53). Weak linkage means that this pressure often ceases after elections bring 
about a change in government, enabling the new government ‘to violate democratic norms at low 
external cost.’ The authors state that this is the situation in much of sub-Saharan Africa (Levitsky 
& Way, 2010, p. 54). 
4. Case studies 
Tunisia 
Following the fall of former President Ben Ali in January 2011, civil society and state bureaucracy 
helped to rapidly reestablish institutions and guide the transition through parliamentary elections 
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and constitutional processes. While challenges remain, the proper conduct of the 2011 elections 
by transitional authorities and commissions was an important step towards an ‘organised political 
life’ (Droz Vincent, 2012, p. 123). Moreover, the military was clear that it would not interfere in 
politics regardless of the results of the elections. It played a key logistical role in securing 
electoral processes, but maintained a strong ‘apolitical and legalist’ role (Droz Vincent, 2012, p. 
123).  
A report published by the International Peace and Security Institute (IPSI) outlines reasons for 
the relative success of the Tunisian transition as well as highlighting challenges faced during that 
transition (Sarsar, 2013, p. 3). One of the key challenges was that despite a push for change, the 
first transitional government was composed of several ministers who worked under former 
President Ben Ali. The report argues that this explains the failure of the first provisional 
government (Sarsar, 2013, p. 3). It does not however provide detailed information or analysis on 
this point. 
The same report argues that the creation of new “consensus gathering” institutions was key in 
overcoming crises experienced during the transition. One such institution was the HIROR (the 
High Authority for the Achievement of the Revolution’s Objectives, Political Reform, and 
Democratic Transition). HIROR was the source of all laws during the first transition period, 
including those related to political parties, associations, electoral law and the communication 
sector. Membership consisted of political parties and civil society groups. HIROR was 
responsible for the drafting of the electoral law, in which particular attention was paid to gender 
equality (Sarsar, 2013, pp. 3-4). 
Civil society also played a key role in the Tunisian transition. This included acting as a mediator 
between the government and the opposition and participating in the dialogue for the proposal 
and enactment of new bills (Sarsar, 2013, pp. 3-4). 
Egypt 
Following the fall of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the country entered a 
period of political transition. According to one peer-reviewed journal article, the military were 
‘tacitly entrusted’ with the survival of the authoritarian regime. (Awad, 2013, p. 289). The military 
subsequently opted to partner with the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Awad, this was 
because they believed that ‘the Muslim Brotherhood’s organisation could enable them to ensure 
that the country is smoothly run while they would take care of strategic orientations and keep 
their priveleges’ (2013, p. 289). Awad argues that the military’s indifference to democracy had a 
significant impact on the political transition in Egypt (2013, p. 289). Morsi was removed from 
power in a coup d’état in 2013 following popular demonstrations against his rule. He was 
succeeded by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who remains in power, marking a return to military 
rule. According to Springborg, the military’s continuing dominance in Egypt can be attributed to 
their prevention of any viable civilian alternatives from emerging. He argues that the military will 
remain in power ‘unless and until it fractures from intra-organizational dissent or from conflicts 
between it and other components of the deep state, or is overwhelmed by wide-scale chaos and 
systemic breakdown’ (Springborg, 2017, p. 496).  
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